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1. Stable Networks
In our model the network structure is exogenously given and we do not study network
formation. Nonetheless, we may ask whether patient players can benet in the bargaining
game from forming new links or severing existing ones. The algorithm A(G) can be used to
address this question. Fix the set of players N, and let G be the set of networks G with vertex
set equal to N. A payo function u assigns to each player i 2 N a payo, denoted ui(G),
for every network G 2 G. If v
i (G) and v
i(G) denote the equilibrium payo of player i in the
bargaining game on the network G (with the uniform matching technology) for the common
discount factor , and respectively its limit as  ! 1, then the proles (v
i (G))i2N;G2G and
(v
i(G))i2N;G2G dene payo functions. For every network G and any i 6= j 2 N, let G + ij
(G   ij) denote the network obtained by adding (deleting) the link ij to (from) G.
Denition 1 (Stability). A network G is unilaterally stable with respect to the payo
function u if ui(G)  ui(G   ij) for all ij 2 G. A network G is pairwise stable with
respect to the payo function u if it is unilaterally stable with respect to u, and for all
ij = 2 G, ui(G + ij) > ui(G) only if uj(G + ij) < uj(G).
To rephrase, a network is unilaterally stable if no player benets from severing one of his
links. Pairwise stability requires additionally that no pair of players benet from forming a
new link. Matthew O. Jackson and Asher Wolinsky (1996) motivate the denitions by the
fact that the formation of the link ij necessitates the consent of both players i and j, but
its severance can be done unilaterally by either i or j.
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Theorem 1. (i) Every network is unilaterally stable with respect to (v
i(G))i2N;G2G. (ii) A
network is pairwise stable with respect to (v
i(G))i2N;G2G if and only if it is equitable.
Part (i) of the statement is not surprising, but its proof is involved, as the removal of
a single link may create a chain eect in the procedure for determining limit equilibrium
payos and completely change the decomposition of the network into oligopoly subnetworks.
Proof of Theorem 1. (i) Let ~ G be a network with ij 2 ~ G, and let G = ~ G ij be the network
obtained by deleting the link ij from ~ G. Denote by A(G) = (rs;xs;Ms;Ls;Ns;Gs)s=1;2;:::;s
and A( ~ G) = (~ r~ s; ~ M~ s; ~ L~ s; ~ N~ s; ~ G~ s)~ s=1;2;:::;~ s the outcomes of the algorithm for computing the
limit equilibrium payos for the bargaining games on the networks G and ~ G, respectively.
Let s(k) and ~ s(k) denote the steps at which player k is removed in the algorithms A(G) and
respectively A( ~ G), i.e., s(k) = maxfsjk 2 Nsg; ~ s(k) = maxf~ sjk 2 ~ N~ sg.








j( ~ G)  v

j(G):
It can be easily shown that if i 2 Ls(i) or s(i) = s then A(G) and A( ~ G) lead to identical
outcomes. Therefore, we may assume that i 2 Ms(i) and s(i) < s. In particular, rs(i) < 1.
Note that the outcomes of the algorithms A(G) and A( ~ G) are identical for steps 1;:::;s(i) 
1 and ~ rs(i)  rs(i). Since i 2 Ms(i);rs(i) < 1 and ~ r~ s  rs(i) for ~ s  s(i), it must be that
v
k( ~ G)  rs(i)=(1 + rs(i)) = v
i(G) for all k 2 Ns(i) = ~ Ns(i). Hence v
i( ~ G)  v
i(G).
We next show that v
j( ~ G)  v
j(G). There are three cases to consider: j 2 Ls(j);j 2 Ms(j),
and s(j) = s. We only solve the former case; the other two can be handled by similar
methods.
Henceforth we focus on the case i 2 Ms(i);j 2 Ls(j). Then s(j) < s and rs(j) < 1. The
following lemma will be used repeatedly.
Lemma 1. Suppose that (rs;xs;Ms;Ls;Ns;Gs)s=1;2;:::;s is the outcome of the algorithm A(G).
For any s < s, and any non-empty L0  Ls,
jL0j
jLGs(L0) \ Msj
 rs:BARGAINING IN NETWORKS 3
Proof. Let M0 = LGs(L0)\Ms. Then Ls = LGs(Ms) and LGs(L0)\(MsnM0) = ; imply that





it follows that jLs n L0j=jMs n M0j  rs = jLsj=jMsj. Hence jL0j=jM0j  jLsj=jMsj = rs. 
For ~ s = s(i)   1;s(i);:::; ~ s(j) we show that
(1) ~ r~ s  rs(j)
(2) ~ M~ s \ ([
s(j)
s=s(i)Ls) = ;
(3) ~ L~ s \ ([
s(j)
s=s(i)Ms) = ;
by induction on ~ s. The induction base case, ~ s = s(i) 1, follows trivially. Suppose we proved
the three assertions for all lower values, and we proceed to proving them for ~ s. Each of the
parts below establishes the corresponding assertion.
Part 1. We prove the rst part of the induction step, ~ r~ s  rs(j). Let ~ M = ~ Ms(i)[:::[ ~ M~ s 1
and ~ L = L
~ Gs(i)( ~ M) = ~ Ls(i) [ ::: [ ~ L~ s 1. Note that ~ L = L
~ Gs(i)( ~ M) = LGs(i)( ~ M) since




s=s(i)Ms n ~ M is non-empty as it contains i, and is contained in ~ N~ s since by the
induction hypothesis, ~ L~ s0 \ ([
s(j)




s=s(i)Ms n ~ M)j
j [
s(j)




s=s(i)Msn ~ M is G-independent (Lemma 5), and also ~ G-independent ( ~ G = G+ij;i 2
Ms(i);j 2 Ls(j)), so the inequality above implies that ~ r~ s  rs(j).
Fix s 2 s(i);s(j). Let L0 = LsnLGs(Ms\ ~ M). Note that LGs(L0)\Ms  Msn ~ M. Lemma
1 applied to step s of A(G) with L0 dened above implies that1
jLsj   jLGs(Ms \ ~ M)j
jMs n ~ Mj
 rs:
As LGs(Ms \ ~ M)  LGs(i)( ~ M) \ Ls, it follows that
jLsj   jLGs(i)( ~ M) \ Lsj
jMs n ~ Mj
 rs:
1The argument is only necessary and relevant when Ms \ ~ M 6= ;;Ms.4 MIHAI MANEA
Since rs  rs(j) for all s 2 s(i);s(j), the set of inequalities above imply that
Ps(j)
s=s(i)(jLsj   jLGs(i)( ~ M) \ Lsj)
Ps(j)










s=s(i) Ms n ~ Mj
 rs(j):
The letter inequality can be rewritten as
j [
s(j)
s=s(i) Ls n LGs(i)( ~ M)j
j [
s(j)













equality follows from ~ G = G+ij;i 2 Ms(i);j 2 Ls(j)), and ~ G~ s does not contain any players in
~ L = LGs(i)( ~ M). Then L
~ G~ s([
s(j)
s=s(i)Ms n ~ M)  [
s(j)





s=s(i)Ms n ~ M)j
j [
s(j)
s=s(i) Ms n ~ Mj
 rs(j);
as desired.
Part 2. We prove the second part of the induction step, ~ M~ s \([
s(j)
s=s(i)Ls) = ;, by contradic-
tion. Suppose that ~ M~ s \ ([
s(j)
s=s(i)Ls) 6= ;, and let s0 be the smallest index s 2 s(i);s(j) for
which ~ M~ s \ Ls 6= ;. Dene B = ~ M~ s \ Ls0 and A = LGs0(B) \ Ms0.
We argue that A  ~ N~ s. Fix k 2 A. Player k has a G-link to a player l 2 B. If k is
removed at step ~ s0 < ~ s in the algorithm A( ~ G) then k 2 ~ M~ s0 by the induction hypothesis
(~ L~ s0 \ ([
s(j)
s=s(i)Ms) = ;). Then l 2 ~ L~ s0 or l = 2 ~ N~ s0, contradicting that l 2 ~ M~ s. Therefore,
k 2 ~ N~ s.
Note that L
~ G~ s(A) \ ~ M~ s  B [ fjg since players in A  Ms0 may only have G-links to
players in L1[L2[:::[Ls0 (Lemma 5), and ~ M~ s\(L1[L2[:::[Ls0) = B by the denition
of s0. If i 2 A then we could have j 2 L
~ G~ s(A) \ ~ M~ s. Lemma 1 applied for step ~ s of A( ~ G)
with L0 = A and Part 1 imply that
jAj
jBj + 1
 ~ r~ s  rs(j) < 1:
Hence jAj < jBj + 1, or jAj  jBj.BARGAINING IN NETWORKS 5
Since A = LGs0(B) \ Ms0, Lemma 1 applied to step s0 of A(G) with L0 = B implies that
jBj
jAj
 rs0  rs(j) < 1:
Hence jAj > jBj, a contradiction with jAj  jBj. Therefore ~ M~ s \ ([
s(j)
s=s(i)Ls) = ;.
Part 3. To establish the third part of the induction hypothesis, ~ L~ s \ ([
s(j)
s=s(i)Ms) = ;, we
proceed by contradiction. Suppose that k 2 ~ L~ s \ ([
s(j)
s=s(i)Ms). It should be that k has a ~ G~ s
link to a player l 2 ~ M~ s. By Lemma 5, since ~ G~ s is a subnetwork of Gs(i), k 2 [
s(j)
s=s(i)Ms may
only have ~ G~ s links to players in [
s(j)
s=s(i)Ls, so l 2 [
s(j)
s=s(i)Ls. Therefore, l 2 ~ M~ s \ ([
s(j)
s=s(i)Ls),
a contradiction with Part 2.
In particular, for ~ s = ~ s(j) the induction hypothesis implies that j 2 ~ L~ s(j) and ~ r~ s(j)  rs(j).
Then v
j( ~ G) = 1=(1 + ~ r~ s(j))  1=(1 + rs(j)) = v
j(G).
(ii) To prove the \if" part of the statement, let ~ G be an equitable network. Part (i) shows
that ~ G is unilaterally stable with respect to (v
i(G))i2N;G2G. Note that by Theorem 5 when
a link is added to an equitable network another equitable network obtains. Hence ~ G + ij is
equitable, and v
i( ~ G + ij) = v
i( ~ G) = 1=2 for all i 6= j 2 N. Therefore, ~ G is pairwise stable
with respect to (v
i(G))i2N;G2G.
To prove the \only if" part of the statement, let ~ G be a network that is pairwise stable
with respect to (v
i(G))i2N;G2G. Suppose that ~ G is not equitable. Let (~ r~ s; ~ M~ s; ~ L~ s; ~ N~ s; ~ G~ s)~ s
denote the outcome of the algorithm A( ~ G). Then there exist i;j 2 ~ M1 such that v
i( ~ G) =
v
j( ~ G) < 1=2 (j ~ M1j  2). The limit equilibrium payos of players i and j in the game on the
network ~ G+ij satisfy v
i( ~ G+ij)  v
i( ~ G) and v
j( ~ G+ij)  v
j( ~ G) by part (i) of the theorem.
By Proposition 2, v
i( ~ G+ij)+v
j( ~ G+ij)  1. Hence, v
i( ~ G+ij)+v
j( ~ G+ij) > v
i( ~ G)+v
j( ~ G),
which together with v
i( ~ G + ij)  v
i( ~ G) and v
j( ~ G + ij)  v
j( ~ G), leads to a violation of the
pairwise stability of ~ G.2 The contradiction proves that ~ G is equitable. 
While every network is unilaterally stabile with respect to the equilibrium payos in the
limit as players become patient, the conclusion does not necessarily apply before taking the
limit. Indeed, not every network is unilaterally stable with respect to (v
i (G))i2N;G2G for
 < 1. Consider the network G2 from Figure 2 in the paper. Note that G
2 is obtained
2It can be shown that the latter two inequalities hold strictly, which is necessary for the proof of the
subsequent Corollary 1.6 MIHAI MANEA































Thus both players 1 and 5 benet from removing the link connecting them and prefer playing
the game on G
2 rather than G2.
The intuition for this observation is simple. For the range of discount factors considered,
(1;5) is an equilibrium disagreement link in the bargaining game on G2, whence it becomes a
source of delay for the possible agreements and deates the equilibrium payos of all players.
However, the gains to players 1 and 5 from severing the link (1;5) vanish as  approaches 1.
If players only consider deleting or adding links when the ensuing gains are signicant, we
need to focus on approximate stability.
Denition 2 ("-Stability). A network G is unilaterally "-stable with respect to the payo
function u if ui(G) + "  ui(G   ij) for all ij 2 G. A network G is pairwise "-stable with
respect to the payo function u if it is unilaterally "-stable with respect to u, and for all
ij = 2 G, ui(G + ij) > ui(G) + " only if uj(G + ij) < uj(G) + ".
For any suciently low " > 0, there exists a discount factor threshold  < 1 such that the
two statements of Theorem 1 also hold for "-stability with respect to the equilibrium payos
for any  > . The next result is based on ideas from the proofs of Theorem 1 above and
Theorem 4 from the paper.
Corollary 1. There exists  " > 0 such that for every " <  " there exists  < 1 such that the
following statements are true for all  > . (i) Every network is unilaterally "-stable with
respect to (v
i (G))i2N;G2G. (ii) A network is pairwise "-stable with respect to (v
i (G))i2N;G2G
if and only if it is equitable.
In the context of buyer-seller networks the denition of pairwise stability should account
for the fact that only buyer-seller pairs may consider forming new links.
Denition 3 (Buyer-seller stability). A buyer-seller network G is two-sided pairwise
stable with respect to the payo function u if it is unilaterally stable with respect to u, and
for all (i;j) 2 (B  S) [ (S  B), ui(G + ij) > ui(G) only if uj(G + ij) < uj(G).BARGAINING IN NETWORKS 7
The next result is the analogue of Theorem 1.ii.
Theorem 1:iiBS. A buyer-seller network is two-sided pairwise stable with respect to (v
i(G))i2N;G2G
if and only if it is non-discriminatory.
2. Heterogeneous Discount Factors
In the paper all players are assumed to have the same discount factor. We can extend
the results to the case of heterogeneous discount factors, where the players of type i share
a discount factor i. The accumulation points of the equilibrium payos and agreement
networks along a (1;2;:::;n) sequence that converges to (1;1;:::;1) depend on the choice
of the sequence.3 One condition that guarantees convergence of the equilibrium payos and
agreement network is that the relative rates of convergence of i and j to 1 be constant
along the sequence of discount factors. That is, there exists  = (1;2;:::;n) such that
i = i for  2 (0;1). Denote by  ; the bargaining game with payos modied by the
assumption that i has discount factor i for all i 2 N and   0.
For a xed , we are interested in the asymptotic equilibrium behavior in  ; as  ! 1.
Theorems 1 and 2 generalize verbatim. The notation for  ;v;;G;G;v;::: needs to
be replaced by  ;;v();();G();G();v();::: to reect the dependence of the
variables on .
Remark 1. For a subnetwork H of G, the analogue of the linear system 3.3 used in the

















As in the proof of Proposition 1 the unique solution v
;H
i () is given by Cramer's rule,
as the ratio of two determinants that are nite sums of positive real powers (which are
not necessarily polynomials) of . In order to show that for xed i;j;H there exists a nite




j ()) = 1 we invoke a result due to Edmond
3For example, in the game for the two player network, if discount factors are given by the pair (a;b)
(a;b > 0), then as  ! 1 the limit equilibrium payos are (b=(a+b);a=(a+b)). For dierent choices of (a;b)
the limit equilibrium payos for the corresponding sequence of discount factors vary accordingly. For the
sequence of discount factors indexed by n given by (1 1=n;1 1=n) for odd n and (1 1=n;(1 1=n)2) for
even n, the set of equilibrium payos has two accumulation points, (1=2;1=2) and (2=3;1=3). Similarly, for
more complicated network structures, the limit equilibrium agreement network depends on the sequence of
discount factors, and convergence does not always obtain.8 MIHAI MANEA
N. Laguerre (1883). The result extends Descartes' rule of signs, which provides a bound for
the number of positive real roots of polynomials in , to the case of linear combinations of
powers of . A corollary of Laguerre's result is that every nite linear combination of positive
powers of  which does not vanish everywhere has a nite number of solutions.4
Theorem 3. For every G()-independent set M, with partner set L = LG()(M), the






















Proof. We follow similar steps to the proof of Theorem 3 in the paper. The only innovation
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)   
jv
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The conclusion is reached as in the proof of Theorem 3. 








and leave the denitions of the other variables unchanged, the new procedure delivers the
limit equilibrium payos of  ; when  ! 1 as detailed in Theorem 4.5
4If all components of  are rational numbers we can avoid non-polynomial functions by using the substitution
 ! c, where c is the least common multiple of the denominators of 1;2;:::;n.
5The extension of the proofs of Lemma 3 and Theorem 4 virtually consists in replacing everywhere the
cardinality set operator j  j by the -weight operator j  j, dened by jMj =
P
i2M i for every M  N.BARGAINING IN NETWORKS 9
Figure 1. Network G
3(p)
3. An Example with Asymmetric Bargaining Protocols
The conclusions of Theorems 3 and 4 do not immediately extend to more general bargain-
ing protocols. The following example illustrates some of the diculties.
Example 1. Consider the network G3 with 9 players illustrated in Figure 3 of the paper.
The following procedure determines the probability p(i ! j) with which player i is chosen to
make an oer to player j for any link ij in G3. Every link is selected with equal probability,
and for each selection except (2;6) and (2;7), each of the two matched players is equally likely
to be the proposer. If the link (2;6) ((2;7)) is selected, then player 2 is twice as likely as player
6 (7) to be the proposer. Mathematically, p(2 ! 6) = p(2 ! 7) = 1=18;p(6 ! 2) = p(7 !
2) = 1=36 and p(i ! j) = 1=24 for all other links ij in G3. We similarly dene the probability
distribution of moves by nature p0 to give player 2 asymmetric bargaining power in encounters
with players 8 and 9, by p0(2 ! 8) = p0(2 ! 9) = 1=18;p0(8 ! 2) = p0(9 ! 2) = 1=36 and
p0(i ! j) = 1=24 for all other links ij in G3.
Consider rst the game induced by the probability distribution p. By arguments similar to
those from Example 2 in the paper, we obtain that the limit equilibrium agreement network
is the subnetwork G








7(p) = 3=11 and v
8(p) = v
9(p) = 1=3.
The intuition is that player 2 can extort players 6 and 7 for more than 2/3, since he enjoys
increased bargaining power in pairwise interactions with each of these players. Players 6 and
7 have to reach agreements when matched to bargain with 1, since they would receive limit
equilibrium payos of at most 1/5 if they were monopolized by 2. Then player 1 will be able
to take advantage of the weakness of 6 and 7, and also reach equally favorable agreements
with 4 and 5. Player 1 can extort 4 and 5 because these two players do not have other10 MIHAI MANEA
bargaining partners. In the limit, since players 1 and 2 reach agreements on very favorable
terms with 4, 5, 6 and 7, they are not attractive bargaining partners for 8 and 9. Players 8
and 9 have monopsony power over 3, and thus can secure limit equilibrium payos of 1/3.
Hence, as players become patient, 8 and 9 do not have incentives to reach agreements with
1 or 2.
Consider next the game induced by p0. The limit equilibrium agreement network is identi-
cal to G










9 = 1=3. Player 2 cannot use his stronger
bargaining power in pairwise interactions with 8 and 9 to obtain a limit equilibrium payo
larger than 2=3. The intuition is that 8 and 9 can secure limit equilibrium payos of 1/3 in
pairwise agreements with 3, since they constitute the only bargaining partners for 3. Hence
8 and 9 cannot be pressured to surrender more than 2/3 to player 2 in the limit, despite
their relatively smaller chance of proposing when matched to bargain with 2. Equilibrium
agreements do not arise across the links (1;8) and (1;9) when players are suciently patient
for the reasons outlined in Example 2.
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